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A B S T R A C T
Following the food price crisis in 2008, African governments implemented policies aiming at crowding in in-
vestment in rice value chain upgrading to help domestic rice compete with imports. We assess the state of rice
value chain upgrading in West Africa by reviewing evidence on rice millers’ investment in semi-industrial and
industrial milling technologies, contract farming and vertical integration during the post-crisis period
2009–2019. We find that upgrading is more dynamic in countries with high rice production and import bills and
limited comparative advantage in demand. However, scaling of upgrading faces several challenges in terms of
vertical coordination, technology, finance and policies. Our assessment can help value chain actors and policy
makers refine upgrading strategies and policies to increase food security in West Africa.
1. Introduction
The food price crisis in 2008 redirected international attention to-
wards domestic food value chains’ (VCs) capacity and resilience in
providing food security in developing countries (World Bank, 2008). In
West Africa, the attention turned towards rice VCs because rice is the
most important calorie source in this region (Macauley and Ramadjita,
2015). To address chronic hunger through macro-nutrient self-suffi-
ciency, African policy makers developed targeted National Rice De-
velopment Strategies (NRDS) under the Coalition for African Rice De-
velopment (CARD, 2019). However, while domestic rice production
increased after the crisis, domestic rice VCs never managed to catch up
with consumption, leading to an increasing gap that is satisfied through
imports (Mendez del Villar and Lançon, 2015). Therefore, policy ma-
kers were urged to revisit their productivist NRDS and create a favorable
enabling environment for crowding in private sector investment in VC
upgrading (Demont, 2013).
A decade after the 2008 food price crisis, it is time to make an as-
sessment of the current state of rice VC upgrading in West Africa. Are
domestic rice VCs being upgraded in this region, and if they are, what
type of investments have been conducted and where? In particular,
there is little information about investments in new processing tech-
nologies that would help domestic rice compete with imports quality-
and cost-wise. Therefore, this paper attempts to document the techno-
logical and coordination changes that have been implemented at pro-
cessing level in rice VCs in West Africa over the last decade. In parti-
cular, we compile and review evidence of public and private investment
in upgraded processing facilities, contract farming schemes and vertical
integration in 15 West African countries. We also assess the opportu-
nities and challenges encountered in rice VC upgrading. Our assessment
may help policy makers at national and regional levels and VC actors
revisit and refine upgrading strategies and policies during the revision
of the NRDS under the CARD Phase 2, which aims at doubling rice
production in Sub-Saharan Africa from 28 million tons in 2019 to 56
million tons by 2030 (CARD, 2019).
2. Method
To identify, collect and validate evidence of investment in rice VC
upgrading in the 15 West African countries (Table 2), we followed three
stages. First, we conducted a non-systematic review of peer-reviewed
and non-peer reviewed literature. We initiated our literature review
with a focused search of economic studies through Econlit using the
following keywords: rice; value chain; investment; mill; processing;
contract; vertical integration; and the names of the 15 West African
countries. The keywords aimed at identifying investments in semi-
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industrial and industrial milling technologies and in contract farming
and vertical integration, implemented during the decade of 2009–2019
in the wake of the food price crisis. We then expanded our search
to cover multiple disciplines by using Web of Science® and
Google Scholar®. To identify non-peer reviewed evidence such as re-
ports from development organizations, we further broadened our
search by using Google® and Bing®. We drew significant insights from
the study on rice VCs in Africa that was carried out by the Food For-
tification Initiative and the Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition (FFI
and GAIN, 2017). Secondly, to complete our literature review and va-
lidate the evidence, we drew on personal expertise and consultation of
experts through the authors' professional network of partners estab-
lished under the CGIAR Flagship Project on “Upgrading Rice Value
Chains” (http://ricecrp.org). Thirdly, we presented our final assessment
at (i) the Fifth International Rice Congress, Singapore, 14–17 October
2018; and (ii) the regional workshop on “Leveraging small and medium
rice millers for rural transformation and investment in the rice sector in
Africa,” jointly organized by the Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations (FAO), the Africa Rice Center and the Rice Council
of Tanzania in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 28–30 May 2019 (http://
ricecrp.org/news). At the workshop, the evidence was validated by 48
participants representing public and private sectors from nine African
countries (Benin, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Se-
negal, Tanzania, and Uganda) (Arouna, 2019). To the best of our
knowledge, the resulting evidence compiled in Table 2 can be con-
sidered to be quasi-exhaustive and representative of the current state of
rice VC upgrading in West Africa.
To analyse the evidence, we first measured dynamism of rice VC
upgrading in the 15 West African countries through four outcome in-
dicators: (i) number of investments in semi-industrial and industrial
mills that were operational in 2019; (ii) aggregate upgraded milling
capacity; (iii) the number of farmers involved in contract farming; and
(iv) the area under vertical integration. We further traced the origin of
investment as an intermediate outcome indicator capturing the extent
to which rice sectors crowd in public investment (PI), foreign direct
investment (FDI) or domestic private investment (DPI). Secondly, we
compiled a list of factors that could favour and hinder investment in
modern milling technologies and ran a linear regression analysis to
identify the main factors that explain heterogeneity of rice VC up-
grading among the 15 West African countries.
3. Background: upgrading domestic rice value chains to improve
food security in West Africa
3.1. Rice for food security in West Africa
Food insecurity remains an issue in West Africa. At the global level,
the number of undernourished people (i.e. people whose dietary energy
consumption is below their dietary energy requirement) decreased from
841.7 million in 2009 to 821.6 million in 2018 (FAO, 2019). However,
the number of undernourished people in West Africa increased from
31.5 million to 56.1 million over the same period, representing 14.7%
of the West African population in 2018. Between 2009 and 2018, there
were on average 15.7 million of undernourished people in Nigeria, and
at least one million people undernourished in almost each other West
African country (Table 1).
In West Africa, rice is a strategic commodity for food security. Rice
consumption quickly expanded since the 1960s driven by demographic
growth, rising per capita consumption and urbanization (Mendez del
Villar and Lançon, 2015). The annual per capita rice consumption
steadily increased from 10 kg in 1961 to 54 kg in 2017 (USDA, 2018).
Between 2009 and 2013, rice consumption was more important in West
Africa than in any other region of the continent. In particular, the
highest rice consumption rates were observed in Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Liberia and Sierra Leone (more than 90 kg per capita per year), and in
Senegal, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia and Mali (more than 50 kg
per capita per year) (Table 1). Furthermore, rice consumption rapidly
increased in Nigeria (2.3% per year) and Ghana (1.8%), the two most
populated countries in the region. Rice therefore becomes an increas-
ingly important source of calories in West Africa. The average energy
contributed by rice increased from 367 to 384 kcal per capita and per
day between 2009 and 2013. This makes rice a strategic commodity to
tackle food insecurity in the region.
Since the independence, rice production is rapidly increasing in
West Africa. The production steadily increased from around 2.2 million
tons in 1962 to 12.7 million tons in 2018 (USDA, 2019). Over the
2009–2019 decade, West Africa produced an average of 10.1 million
tons of rice annually, representing 65.6% of the total Sub-Saharan
African production (Table 1). The main producers in West Africa were
Nigeria (3.7 million tons), Mali (1.4 million tons), Guinea (1.3 million
tons) and Côte d’Ivoire (1.1 million tons). Furthermore, rice production
continues to grow. Over the last decade, the average annual growth rate
of rice production was 10.1%. The countries that mostly contributed to
this increase were Nigeria, Senegal, Mali, Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire,
where production increased between 9.1% and 19.4% per year. This
increase was fuelled by an increase in rice areas (7.5% per year). On the
contrary, yield gains did not contribute much to production increase,
because of low adoption of improved varieties and lack of good quality
seed (Arouna et al., 2017a), low use of inputs and low adoption of good
agricultural practices.
However, West Africa faces a structural rice deficit, and the region
increasingly relies on imports. Indeed, the increase in production is not
able to keep pace with the sharp increase in rice consumption (USDA,
2019). The share of imported rice in total consumption increased from
20% in the 1960s to 46% in 2009. This ratio slightly decreased between
2009 and 2019, due to small reductions in imports recorded in Senegal,
Mali, Mauritania and Guinea-Bissau. However, rice import dependency
increased in all other West African countries over the same period. The
main importers were Nigeria (2.4 million tons), Côte d’Ivoire (1.2
million tons) and Senegal (1 million tons). West Africa therefore re-
mains the second biggest rice importer in the world, after China.
3.2. Policies to upgrade domestic rice value chains in West Africa
Domestic rice in West Africa is mainly supplied by traditional VCs.
These VCs proliferated after liberalization and the decrease in state
control of industrial mills. They are often made of several inter-
mediaries owning little capital and managing small quantities (Reardon
et al., 2014). Traditional millers tend to purchase paddy through spot
transactions, which do not include quality criteria and incentives for
proper moisture rates, impurity rates, and varietal homogeneity. The
traditional technologies used by millers include manual milling, as well
as the simple huller, monobloc (one-pass mill) and minirizeries. As a
Fig. 1. Average global rice price (US$/t f.o.b.).
Note: Prices are free on board (f.o.b.), weighted by their share of the total rice
internationally traded.
Source: OSIRIZ/InfoArroz (2018).
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result, traditional millers generally produce rice of low quality and
purity featuring a heterogeneous mix of varieties and high rates of
broken grains, leading to low cooking quality of the product. These
traditional VCs have difficulties competing against structured import
VCs in terms of quality, cost and scale (Soullier and Moustier, 2013).
The food price crisis in 2008 revealed that global market depen-
dence was a risk for national food security. Within a few weeks, the rice
price increased threefold, and remained steady at a higher level than
prior to the crisis (Fig. 1). This led to protests in several major cities,
and some of the poorest and most vulnerable households became food
insecure (Cudjoe et al., 2010; Kumar and Quisumbing, 2013). This food
price crisis was a major incentive for policies to upgrade domestic rice
VCs (Seck et al., 2010). In order to improve food security in West Africa,
African policy makers developed targeted NRDS under the Coalition for
African Rice Development (CARD, 2019). The purpose was to replace
imports by domestic rice.
The literature on VCs defines upgrading as the process of acquiring
new skills and accessing new markets through participation in a par-
ticular VC (Humphrey, 2004). In West Africa, policies mainly aim at
upgrading rice VCs through technical and organizational changes, in
order to increase the quantity produced and decrease production costs
through economies of scale. Policies targeted an increase in paddy
production by providing small-scale producers with access to improved
inputs and increasing the area planted in rice through land develop-
ments (Demont, 2013). Policies also encouraged and supported in-
vestments in semi-industrial or industrial milling technologies. Indeed,
these technologies perform functions that dramatically improve the
quality of milled rice. These functions include pre-cleaning, drying,
cleaning, stone picking, weighting, hulling, separating, whitening,
grading and bagging. Two broad types of upgraded technologies exist.
The semi-industrial milling technology is a milling line performing at
least four quality upgrading functions and with a theoretical capacity
ranging between two and three tons of paddy per hour. The industrial
technology is a milling line performing at least six quality upgrading
functions and with a theoretical capacity ranging between three and
five tons of paddy per hour. Investments in such technologies often
include large storage capacities. The investments in these upgraded
technologies were promoted by international organizations (CARD,
2008; World Bank, 2008), and several states created national agencies
supporting foreign investors (Tyrou et al., 2019). Some policies also
supported traditional millers to upgrade their technologies through
subsidies.
The companies managing upgraded technologies need to collect
high volumes of paddy to achieve economies of scale, and to collect
paddy of good quality. Indeed, the quality of paddy, defined in terms of
cleanliness, moisture content, varietal purity and homogeneity,
strongly influences milled rice quality. For these reasons, upgraded
mills can deploy vertical coordination modes with rice growers. Millers
can indirectly control paddy production through contract farming, de-
fined as “a sales arrangement between a farmer and a firm, agreed
before production begins, which provides the farmer with resources or
services” (Ton et al., 2018). Contract farming may include the supply
and/or prefinancing of improved inputs, credit and technical advice,
and quality criteria rewarded through price premiums. Such access to
improved input and quality markets can improve farmers’ income
(Bellemare and Bloem, 2018; Bellemare and Lim, 2018; Ton et al.,
2018; Arouna et al., 2017b). Alternatively, millers can directly control
paddy production. In this arrangement, which is often called vertical
integration or hierarchy, millers employ workers to grow rice on their
fields and maintain direct administrative control over agricultural
production.
3.3. Cultural and physical barriers to rice imports
Upgrading domestic rice VCs in West Africa is a challenge because
consumers in coastal countries and cities generally prefer imported rice,
with the exception of those close to secondary centers of origin of rice
domestication such as Guinea, Sierra Leone, The Gambia and the
Casamence region in Senegal (Demont, 2013; Demont et al., 2017;
Demont and Ndour, 2015). However, research based on framed field
experiments has revealed that domestic rice can compete with imported
rice if its quality is tailored to urban consumer preferences (Demont
et al., 2017; Demont and Ndour, 2015). Furthermore, in the competi-
tion against imports, two comparative advantages “shield” countries
from world market pressures and mitigate exposure to rice imports to
some extent. First, countries' remoteness from a seaport and landlocked
status can act as a physical barrier and mitigate exposure to imports as it
increases the competitiveness of locally produced rice relative to im-
ported rice (Demont, 2013; Demont and Ndour, 2015). Secondly,
countries’ proximity to the primary (middle Niger delta in Mali) and
secondary centers of origin of rice domestication (Fouta Djallon high-
lands in Guinea and the Gambia and Casamance rivers) tend to preserve
indigenous preferences for local rice. Hence, proximity to origin of rice
domestication can raise cultural (preference) barriers to rice importation
as consumers tend to be more attached to local rice due to an ingrained
3000-year-old tradition of producing and consuming rice locally. In
other words, preference for local rice endows local rice sectors with a
“comparative advantage in demand,” which reduces the competitive
pressure to upgrade rice VCs (Demont, 2013; Demont et al., 2017;
Demont and Ndour, 2015). The absence of a comparative advantage of
demand, on the other hand, tends to make rice sectors more vulnerable
to import pressure, which triggers competitive responses in terms of
investments in varietal quality, processing technologies, improved
packaging and labelling.
4. Evidence of rice value chain upgrading in West Africa
In Table 2, we present the status of rice VC upgrading in the 15 West
African countries through the four outcome indicators presented in the
method, the intermediate outcome indicator of the origin of invest-
ment, as well as the factors that were retained for the regression ana-
lysis aiming at explaining heterogeneity of upgrading (Table 3 and
Table 4). Based on the outcome indicators, we classify the countries
into three groups, differentiating between countries where the evidence
suggests that rice VC upgrading is (i) dynamic, (ii) moderate or (iii)
inexistent. The evidence compiled in Table 2 suggests that there were
57 operating rice mills with semi-industrial or industrial technologies in
West Africa in 2019, amounting to an aggregate capacity of 315 tons
per hour. We found evidence of contract farming in eight countries,
involving a minimum of 10,890 producers, and vertical coordination in
five countries, covering at least 29,240 ha.
The regression analysis identifies three factors that jointly explain
89% of heterogeneity in aggregate upgraded milling capacity in the 15
countries: (i) the 2008 import bill (total value of rice imports, expressed
in million US$) (IRRI, 2019); (ii) the average annual domestic milled
rice production in 2009–2019 (FAO, 2019); and (iii) cultural (pre-
ference) import barriers (Tables 3 and 4).1 The 2008 import bill (total
value of rice imports by a country) is a measure for the pressure policy
makers may have experienced to decrease reliance on the world market
at the height of the rice price crisis, right before the period of our
analysis (2009–2019). Whereas the import bill measures the market
1 Other factors that could favour and hinder investment in modern milling
technologies that were reviewed include for example World Bank's Doing
Business Score (https://www.doingbusiness.org), number of conflicts, Nominal
Rate of Protection (NRP) at point of competition (POC), Gross Domestic Product
(GDP), average yields (FAO, 2019) and population. However, none of these
indicators successfully explained heterogeneity of investment in rice value
chain upgrading between the groups. Annual import bills are probably en-
dogenous in that they crowd in investments in VC upgrading that seek to re-
place imports. Therefore, we chose the 2008 import bill, which is exogenous to
the period of our analysis (2009–2019).
G. Soullier, et al. Global Food Security 25 (2020) 100365
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opportunities for investors from the demand side in terms of the de-
mand gap that can be closed through domestic production, the annual
production levels measure the market opportunities from the supply
side in terms of paddy availability. Both drivers provided strong in-
centives for private sector investment.
Table 2 suggests that upgrading tends to be more dynamic when
countries and rice sectors are able to attract FDI. It is worthwhile noting
that only cultural (preference) import barriers were found to sig-
nificantly slow down investment and not physical import barriers
(Tables 3 and 4). This was predicted by Demont (2013), who argued
that the extent to which landlockedness reduces exposure to imports
strongly depends on cross-border trade infrastructure and relationships
with neighboring coastal countries (Faye et al., 2004).
Group 1 includes countries where rice VC upgrading was found to
be most dynamic among all countries, i.e. Nigeria and Senegal
(Table 2). The domestic rice sectors in these coastal countries hosting
big seaports (Lagos and Dakar) were exposed to the highest rice import
bills in 2008 (above 500 million US$) without benefiting from any
mitigating physical or cultural barriers. As a result, these countries were
politically most pressured to upgrade their domestic rice VCs. Nigeria
offered the greatest economic opportunities for rice millers in terms of
market size and paddy availability. Indeed, it featured the largest de-
mand (on average 6.0 million tons of rice consumption per year be-
tween 2009 and 2019) (USDA, 2019), and the largest paddy supply in
West Africa (on average 3.7 million tons of milled rice production per
year between 2009 and 2019). In Senegal, average annual rice con-
sumption was 1.5 million tons over the same period (USDA, 2019) and
milled rice production averaged 0.5 million tons (Table 1). The Sene-
galese government, supported by international organizations, im-
plemented attractive policies for investment, notably through the
creation of a national agency promoting foreign investment (Soullier
et al., 2018).
In 2019, there were 24 industrial mills operating in Nigeria and 15
industrial and semi-industrial mills operating in Senegal (FFI and GAIN,
2017; Soullier and Moustier, 2019). Most of these mills were built since
2009 (Awotide et al., 2015). They were owned by foreign private
companies, such as the groups Stallion and Olam in Nigeria, or ASI in
Senegal. Other mills were owned by national actors, such as importers
(FFI and GAIN, 2017) or small-scale millers that upgraded their tech-
nology (Soullier and Moustier, 2019). Some of these companies were
established with financial support from international organizations,
such as the CNT mill in Senegal (Soullier and Moustier, 2019). In 2014,
Senegalese millers processed each between 7000 and 18,000 tons of
paddy and were implementing branding strategies (Soullier and
Moustier, 2019).
To sustainably source reliable volumes of paddy, millers in both
countries in Group 1 adopted vertical coordination modes. In 2014,
three rice millers in Senegal used production contracts to source 15,000
tons of paddy grown on 3500 ha by 1500 producers (Soullier and
Moustier, 2019). The contracts included supply and prefinancing of
seed, fertilizer, herbicides and sometimes technical advice. Farmers
reimbursed the inputs through paddy, and the contracts included
quality criteria (moisture content and impurity rates) (Soullier and
Moustier, 2018). Furthermore, in 2014, five upgraded mills in Senegal
purchased 15,000 tons of paddy from 2000 producers growing 4000 ha
of rice through marketing contracts (Soullier and Moustier, 2019).
These contracts specified quality criteria, but did not include input
supply. The price was negotiated within the interprofessional associa-
tion. In Nigeria, there were at least three industrials mills (Olam, Veetee
and Ebony Rice) that also sourced their supplies through production
contracts (Awotide et al., 2015). In the Nasarawa state, around 3000
rice growers were contracted by Olam (Hathie, 2016). In both coun-
tries, millers also integrated rice production. In this system, the land
could be rented to public agencies, local councils or farmers, and the
millers F controlled paddy production. In Nigeria, rice millers con-
trolled areas ranging from 400 to 10,000 ha (FFI and GAIN, 2017). In
Senegal, the areas ranged from 20 to 2600 ha (Soullier et al., 2018).
Group 2 includes West African countries that faced rice import bills
below 500 million US$ in 2008 and where VC upgrading was slowly
emerging between 2009 and 2019, i.e. Ghana, Mali, Côte d’Ivoire,
Burkina Faso, Liberia, Niger, Sierra Leone, Benin and Togo. Some
countries in this group are fully exposed to the world market (Ghana,
Benin, Liberia and Togo). The others benefit from either physical bar-
riers due to their landlocked status (Niger and Burkina Faso), cultural
barriers due to geographical (Sierra Leone is close to Fouta Djallon in
Guinea) or genealogical2 (Côte d’Ivoire) proximity to rice cultural heri-
tage, or both (Mali) (Demont et al., 2017). Furthermore, most countries
in this group feature lower production levels than countries in Group 1.
Despite high production levels in Côte d’Ivoire (averaging 1.1 million
tons of milled rice per year during 2009–2019) and Mali (1.4 million
tons) (Table 1), political crisis and conflicts in these countries may have
slowed down investment, in addition to reduced exposure to imports
thanks to the cultural and physical barriers mentioned earlier.
Although some of these countries were able to crowd in FDI (Ghana
and Mali), domestic private companies carried out most of the invest-
ments. In Ghana, the foreign private company Avnash built a mill with
a capacity of 20 tons of paddy per hour to market parboiled and white
rice (Ayeduvor, 2018; FFI and GAIN, 2017). Furthermore, three mills
with capacities averaging two tons per hour invested and processed
between 3000 and 9000 tons of paddy per year (FFI and GAIN, 2017).
Table 3
Determinants of aggregate upgraded milling capacity in 15 countries in West
Africa (linear regression).
Variable Coefficient SE P-value
2008 import bill (106 USD) 0.058 0.030 0.077*
Average annual milled rice production
(2009–2019, 103 tons)
0.032 0.007 0.001***
Cultural import barriers −24.660 9.613 0.028**
Physical import barriers −2.769 11.251 0.811
Constant −1.780 8.169 0.832
Notes: Sample size = 15; R2 = 0.911; Adjusted R2 = 0.875; SE: standard error.
Cultural and physical import barriers are captured through dummies. Variance
inflation factors (VIF) are in the range of 1.15–2.61 with a mean VIF of 1.84. A
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity generates a P-value of
0.788. Significance levels: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
Source: Data compiled in Table 2.
Table 4
Determinants of aggregate upgraded milling capacity in 15 countries in West
Africa (stepwise linear regression).
Variable Coefficient SE P-value
2008 import bill (106 USD) 0.061 0.026 0.042**
Average annual milled rice production
(2009–2019, 103 tons)
0.032 0.006 0.000***
Cultural import barriers (dummy) −24.168 8.992 0.021**
Constant −2.773 6.792 0.691
Notes: Sample size = 15; R2 = 0.910; Adjusted R2 = 0.886; SE: standard error.
Cultural and physical import barriers are captured through dummies. Variance
inflation factors (VIF) are in the range of 1.20–2.29 with a mean VIF of 1.90. A
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity generates a P-value of
0.774. Significance levels: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
Source: Data compiled in Table 2.
2 Côte d’Ivoire can be assumed to feature genealogical proximity to the pri-
mary center of origin of rice domestication as it hosts the Mandé ethnic group
who were the first domesticators of African rice who subsequently migrated
southward (Demont et al., 2017).
G. Soullier, et al. Global Food Security 25 (2020) 100365
6
In Mali, four industrial mills were created since 2011 (Coulibaly and
Soullier, 2020). They collect paddy in the Niger Office and use several
milling lines with theoretical capacities ranging between 3 and 5 tons
per hour (Coulibaly and Soullier, 2020). In Côte d’Ivoire, in 2016 an
importer invested in semi-industrial milling and developed the brand Le
Fromager (Soullier et al., 2019). In Burkina Faso, in 2015 the company
Udirba Plus invested in industrial technology performing 10 quality
improving functions, including an optical sorter (Tapsoba, 2016). Fur-
thermore, a semi-industrial miller managed by the WendKonta mill had
a capacity of 16,500 tons of paddy per year (VECO, 2014). In Liberia,
the domestic company Fabrar benefited from subsidies from USAID and
shareholding from the International Finance Corporation to upgrade its
milling technologies (Oxfam, 2018). In Sierra Leone, the domestic
private company Mountain Lion Rice managed a mill performing the
functions of drying, de-stoning, husking and polishing (FFI and GAIN,
2017).
The public sector also financed the building of industrial and semi-
industrial mills in Group 2 countries. In Côte d’Ivoire, the NRDS consisted
in building 30 industrial mills and renting them to private companies.
These mills have a theoretical capacity of processing five tons of paddy
per hour, and components performing pre-cleaning, drying, cleaning, de-
stoning, weighing, hulling, paddy separating, whitening (for three units),
grading and bagging (Soullier et al., 2019). However, only two of these
mills were operating in 2019 (Soullier et al., 2019). They were rented to
national companies in which LDC and Gain Logis were stakeholders. The
Government of Sierra Leone had also purchased two of these mills, but
they were not operational (FFI and GAIN, 2017). In Niger, the public
company Riz du Niger invested in two semi-industrial mills in Tillabéry
and Kollo (Fall 2016; RiceHub, 2016; VECO, 2014). Liberia also features
a public semi-industrial mill (FFI and GAIN, 2017).
Whereas contract farming is often used by millers in Group 2 to
source paddy, vertical integration is rarer. In Ghana, contracts were
documented in the Northern, Volta and Upper East regions, which
supply 80% of national rice production. Bidzakin et al. (2018) surveyed
350 farmers in these regions (out of an estimated population of about
10,000), and found that 40% of them participated in contracts. In
Burkina Faso, in 2017 the industrial mill Urdiba Plus carried out con-
tracts with 140 producers (Sirdey et al., 2018). In Côte d’Ivoire, the two
companies that rented industrial mills from the government in 2018
participated in experimental projects supporting contract farming
(Soullier et al., 2019). These contracts included support to agricultural
practices to improve yields, such as in-row transplanting. In Mali, the
mills had also started implementing contracts with farmer cooperatives
(Coulibaly and Soullier, 2020). Furthermore, only few mills in countries
in Group 2 integrated rice production. The areas reported were 3200 ha
in Mali (Coulibaly and Soullier, 2020), 750 ha in Ghana and 1300 ha in
Sierra Leone (FFI and GAIN, 2017). In Burkina Faso, the government
supported agribusiness investments in agricultural production (Tyrou
et al., 2019), but we did not find any evidence of vertical integration by
rice millers. Finally, in Benin and Togo, the ESOP business model
(Entreprises de Services et Organizations de Producteurs) was developed by
two NGOs (with acronyms CIDR and ETD) to foster family farmers'
inclusion in processing and marketing. The ESOP managed mini rice
mills and purchased their products through contracts. Producers had
the opportunity to gradually become shareholders in the processing
organization (Maertens and Vande Velde, 2017). The contract specified
the supply of inputs, and the quantity, price, delivery time and quality
of the paddy (Adabe et al., 2019; Maertens and Vande Velde, 2017). In
2015, there were 15 ESOPs in Togo (FFI and GAIN, 2017) and 17 in
Benin (ETD, 2016). They purchased paddy from a few hundreds of
producers and marketed around 4000 tons of rice.
Group 3 finally includes countries for which we did not find any
evidence of investment in rice VC upgrading in the 2009–2019 period,
i.e. Guinea, Mauritania, The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau (Table 2). The
largest processing units observed in these countries are mini rice mills,
which process between one and two tons of paddy per hour (FFI and
GAIN, 2017). The 2008 rice import bills in these countries were below
200 million US$, and paddy production was limited, except for Guinea.
Most of the countries in this group are endowed with a comparative
advantage of demand, which substantially reduces the pressure to up-
grade rice VCs.
5. Challenges in rice value chain upgrading in West Africa
5.1. Vertical coordination
The evidence suggests that vertical coordination is fraught with
several challenges, as contract farming in West Africa reached at most
9% of the national population of rice growers in a country (Table 2).
First, several upgraded mills were found to be unprofitable because of
limited availability of paddy. This was most notably observed in Niger
(VECO, 2014), Côte d’Ivoire (Soullier et al., 2019), Senegal (Soullier
and Moustier, 2019), and Burkina Faso (Sirdey et al., 2018), and it was
reported to constrain industrial millers in other countries as well (FFI
and GAIN, 2017). Contract farming and vertical integration are then
deployed to source reliable volumes and quality of paddy. This con-
trasts with more productive rice export VCs in Asia, where contract
farming is predominantly used for governing quality (Ba et al., 2019).
Contract farming in domestic VCs in West Africa faces similar chal-
lenges as in export VCs in Asia, though. First, contract terms must be
tailored to farmers' preferences. This particularly includes the timing of
input delivery and payment (Arouna et al., 2017b; Ochieng et al., 2017;
Van den Broeck et al., 2017). Second, contracts must improve farmers'
living conditions to secure their participation (Barrett et al., 2012). In
the case of export VCs of high value products, the literature documents
that most contract schemes improve farmers income (Reardon et al.,
2009). Some of these positive impacts also extend to the case of rice
export VCs (Nhan, 2019) and even to domestic rice VCs in West Africa,
e.g., in Ghana (Bidzakin et al., 2018), Côte d’Ivoire (Chiapo, 2017), and
Nigeria (Awotide et al., 2015). However, recent evidence in Senegal
uncovered a case where contract farming generated zero or negative
impact because some millers in an oligopsony position offered contracts
to indebted producers that specified lower prices than the market price
(Soullier and Moustier, 2018). Impact on livelihoods is closely related
to farmers' bargaining power and inclusiveness of smallholders. Recent
evidence in rice export VCs suggests that contract farming's typical
scale bias towards larger farms can be successfully reduced through
policies that encourage horizontal coordination between farmers
(Ba et al., 2019). Third, contracts should secure paddy quality. They
often specify quality criteria, but the paddy supplied does not always
comply with these standards. This was reported in the case of Nigeria
(Awotide et al., 2015) and Côte d’Ivoire (Soullier et al., 2019). Fourth,
contract farming does not always successfully reduce opportunistic
behavior by farmers and millers. For instance, farmers sometimes de-
fault on reimbursing the credit when they find another purchaser, and
millers can pay farmers a lower price than the one decided at contract
signature (Awotide et al., 2015). Identifying adapted enforcement in-
stitutions is found to be a critical issue for the reduction of opportunism
in rice export VCs (Ba et al., 2019). The supply chain literature docu-
ments that farmer price incentives are a major driver to reduce side
selling (Barrett et al., 2012). Because contract farming can fail, millers
can decide to directly control rice growing (vertical integration).
However, they can have restricted access to land, such as in Côte d’I-
voire (Soullier et al., 2019) or their land acquisition can generate
conflicts with family farmers (Soullier et al., 2018). This is consistent
with the limited evidence on adoption of vertical integration, which
covered at most 2% of the national rice area in a country (Table 2).
5.2. Managing new technologies
Investments in industrial milling are sometimes undertaken by ac-
tors who lack experience in managing the new technologies. The
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technological change requires millers to develop skills to master
equipment and infrastructure, which involves hiring staff and properly
training them. Local availability of experts and support services to
maintain the equipment and manage the plant are therefore crucial
challenges (IFPRI, 2014). Furthermore, unavailability and lack of local
markets for spare parts of imported milling equipment can hamper
proper technology maintenance and provoke milling breakdowns. This
situation is in contrast with global supply chains which are usually close
to equipment fabricators. Asian millers are directly supplied in the
countries by equipment fabricators such as Alibaba in Thailand. Simi-
larly, larger rice mills prioritize education, training, technology, and
innovation (Horadal, 2019). However, global supply chains are still
dominated by many small rice mills located in regions where the
quality of education and educational opportunities are limited
(Horadal, 2019; World Bank, 2013).
5.3. Finance
Finance is a major constraint hampering domestic rice VC up-
grading. Financing rice growing is a common constraint among family
farmers, which can explain their preference for contract farming.
However, millers face similar constraints. They rarely have access to
formal credit from banks and rely on their own savings, particularly
when they are domestic actors. However, significant operational funds
are required to invest and collect sufficient paddy to reach profitability.
Limited availability of working capital was for instance documented in
Niger, where between 2009 and 2013, the RINI company processed
volumes that represented between 7% and 31% of its annual capacity
(VECO, 2014). It was also reported in Côte d’Ivoire (Soullier et al.,
2019), where the AMC group shifted from contract farming to custom
milling due to cash-flow constraints. This explains both the low rate of
contract offers and, hence, contract participation among rice farmers
and the limited adoption of vertical integration mentioned before
(Table 2). This is another difference with export VCs, that benefit from
support from financial organizations (Ba et al., 2019), and enable im-
porters to offer credits to rice wholesalers. On the contrary, credit ar-
rangement between actors in upgraded domestic VCs is rare. This can
explain wholesalers' preference for marketing imported rice. This
comparative advantage of imported rice even extends to retail and
consumers (Lancon et al., 2004).
5.4. Developing consistent policies for a heterogeneous milling sector
Milling technologies are heterogeneous in scale and in their ability
to compete against imports in terms of quality and cost. Modern rice
VCs governed by industrial and semi-industrial mills supply high
quality rice, while traditional rice VCs have more difficulties in sup-
plying quality rice, particularly in terms of homogeneity and purity.
The different types of VCs supply different market segments and, hence,
contribute differently to food security and income generation. Policy
makers face the challenge of creating an enabling environment that
encourages equitable and inclusive VC upgrading that benefits large-
scale VC entrepreneurs as well as smallholders.
6. Conclusion
We compile and review evidence on investment in rice VC up-
grading in 15 West African countries over the last decade 2009–2019 in
the wake of the world food price crisis. We observed an emerging trend
of investment in semi-industrial or industrial milling technologies and
the implementation of vertical coordination modes. The evidence re-
vealed that in 2019, there were 57 rice mills with semi-industrial or
industrial technologies with an aggregate capacity of 315 tons per hour
operating in West Africa. Although contract farming was carried out in
eight countries, and millers integrated rice growing in five countries,
contract farming reached at best 9% of the national populations of rice
growers and vertical integration covered at most 2% of the national rice
areas. The latter suggests that these institutional innovations face sev-
eral challenges and, as a result, are only emerging slowly in response to
the competitive pressure experienced by rice VC actors.
Using aggregate upgraded milling capacity as an outcome in-
dicator, we observe substantial heterogeneity in rice VC upgrading
among the 15 countries, 89% of which can be explained through three
factors. Rice VC upgrading was found to be more dynamic in countries
featuring (i) high paddy production, (ii) high import bills and (iii)
limited comparative advantage in demand. Rice VC upgrading was
found to be dynamic in Nigeria and Senegal, which crowd in the
highest investment levels from foreign and domestic private sectors.
VC upgrading was found to be moderate and emerging in Ghana, Mali,
Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Liberia, Niger, Sierra Leone, Benin and
Togo. Our review of the literature, consultation with experts and va-
lidation with public and private sector actors did not yield any evi-
dence of rice VC upgrading in Guinea, Mauritania, The Gambia and
Guinea-Bissau.
Consistent with earlier recommendations (Demont, 2013; Demont
et al., 2017; Demont and Ndour, 2015), coastal countries with limited
comparative advantage in demand (Nigeria and Senegal) have indeed
managed to crowd in the highest investment—including FDI—in rice
VC upgrading, while landlocked countries (Mali, Burkina Faso and
Niger) and particularly coastal countries with a comparative advantage
in demand (Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Guinea, The Gambia and
Guinea-Bissau) have lagged behind. However, for the latter two groups
there is no reason for complacency as their rice sectors are continuously
exposed to import competition as well, and will need to maintain
quality-based competitiveness before consumers have the time to de-
velop preferences for imported rice (Demont, 2013). In particular, we
found that landlockedness does not significantly slow down investment
in VC upgrading, exemplified by the emerging evidence in industrial
and semi-industrial mills in Mali and Burkina Faso. On the other hand,
we found that limited comparative advantage in demand is merely an
enabling factor which enables drivers like import bills and paddy
supply triggering investment in VC upgrading. Examples are Ghana,
Liberia, Benin and Togo, where VC upgrading is emerging despite
smaller import bills and paddy production levels compared to Nigeria
and Senegal. We acknowledge that our review of the literature, con-
sultation with experts and validation with public and private sector
actors may have missed out investments that were not yet reported in
the literature or in the authors' professional networks, though.
The first generation of NRDS was heavily focused on productivity
and it was argued that more investment in quality upgrading is needed
to help domestic rice compete with imported rice in import-biased
markets (Demont, 2013). However, our evidence suggests that pro-
ductivist policies aiming at increasing paddy production also indirectly
contribute to VC upgrading. Investment in breeding, agronomic and
post-harvest yield increase and land extension therefore needs to go
hand in hand with investment in VC upgrading to scale up production
of quality rice that is able to compete against imported rice and, hence,
integrate domestic rice VCs in global markets.
Finally, our assessment can help policy makers and VC actors
compare the state of rice VC upgrading among 15 West African coun-
tries, learn from more advanced countries that have successfully
crowded in private investment and even FDI, and revisit and refine
upgrading strategies and policies during the revision of the NRDS under
the CARD Phase 2. Our review uncovered several challenges in scaling
of rice VC upgrading. We recommend future research to focus on de-
veloping optimal policies, coordination and finance mechanisms and
efficient technology support chains to help domestic rice VCs compete
against imports in terms of quality, efficiency, cost and scale.
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